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In the wake of growing disillusionment as to the efficdcy of deter-
rence,' rehabilitation, 2 and incapacitation,3 the last decade has seen a
resurgence of "just deserts" as the rationale for punishing criminals.4
They should be punished because they deserve to be punished. The
quantum of their suffering should be in proportion to the seriousness of
their crime, not according to any assessment of whether they are rehabil-
itated or when they no longer pose a threat to the community.5 Beyond
* I would particularly like to thank Brent Fisse for his incisive criticisms on earlier drafts
of this article. Helpful comments were also made by David Biles, William Clifford, and Ivan
Potas.
** Research Criminologist, Australian Institute of Criminology; Ph.D. Queensland Uni-
versity, 1977.
1 For the most influential reviews of the confusing state of the evidence on the efficacy of
deterrence, see D. BEYLEVELD, A BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GENERAL DETERRENCE RESEARCH
(1980); DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANC-
TIONS ON CRIME RATES (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
A. Blumstein]; J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1975); F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
2 See P. BEAN, REHABILITATION AND DEVIANCE (1976); D. LIPTON, R. M4RTINSON &J.
WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF EVALUATION
STUDIES (1975) [hereinafter cited as D. LIPTON].
3 See A. Blumstein, supra note 1. For the most impressive empirical study and review of
previous evidence, see S. VAN DINE, J. CONRAD & S. DINITZ, RESTRAINING THE WICKED
(1979) [hereinafter cited as S. VAN DINE].
4 See R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT
(1979); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS (1975); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE:
THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Kellogg, From Retribution to "Desert':" The Evolution of
Ciminal Punishment, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 179 (1977).
5 See generaly A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 98-106.
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this core area of agreement, there are as many versions of just deserts as
there are advocates of it. To avoid allegations that the critique of just
deserts launched here is not apposite to the "real" just deserts position,
the writings of its most influential spokesman, von Hirsch, 6 will be the
target of attack.
This article does not attempt to be a comprehensive or definitive
demolition of just deserts as a basis for criminal sentencing. It is a cri-
tique of the concept from one perspective only, the neglected perspective
of what just deserts might mean with respect to white-collar crime.
White-collar crime is defined, according to the conventional definition
of Sutherland,7 as "a crime committed by a person of respectability and
high social status in the course of his [or her] occupation."8 For the pur-
poses of this article, common or traditional crime means all crime which
is not white-collar.
The discussion will attempt to show that it follows from the philoso-
phy of just deserts that more white-collar criminals should be in prison
than common criminals. It will be contended, however, that the practi-
cal exigencies of white-collar crime enforcement make the attainment of
such a state of justice impossible under the desert model. Approximate
even-handedness in the way the powerful and powerless are punished
can be approached, but only if just deserts is rejected as the rationale for
punishment. The article will demonstrate a fundamental irony: utilita-
rian policies potentially can produce a more just and equitable criminal
justice system than can ever be achieved by a policy of just deserts.
Even though it is the latter policy which sets out with the stronger pre-
occupation with justice, the empirical realities of its implementation
make just deserts in practice the source of profound injustice. Before we
can commence this analysis, we must first come to grips with the com-
plexity of fault for organizational crimes.
II. WHO DESERVES TO BE PUNISHED?
A large proportion of white-collar offenses are organizational
crimes,9 perpetrated by persons acting on behalf of their organization-
6Id
7 E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 2 (1949).
8 Following Sutherland, id, white-collar offenses that are normally punished civilly
rather than criminally are included as white-collar crimes. The fact that most white-collar
crime is punished civilly does not mean that it could not be punished criminally. Rather, as
Sutherland pointed out, this state of affairs reflects the success of the powerful in averting the
stigma of the criminal label for their illegalities and the temptation for prosecutors to opt for
the less onerous burden of proof in civil prosecutions. Nevertheless, conduct that is not "pun-
ishable" by law (by fine or imprisonment) but subject only to civil damage awards is not
within our definition of white-collar crime.
9 See C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BE-
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the executive on behalf of the corporation, the government official for
the department, the campaign worker for the campaign committee.
Consequently, deciding who deserves to be punished is much more diffi-
cult than with common crime. There are a number of potential targets
for punishment: a variety of individuals involved in the offense in the
sense of doing, ordering, approving, 10 knowing, or negligently failing to
know;" the head of the organization or the directors who have been
nominated beforehand as the persons who must bear responsibility for
this kind of law observance by their employees; 12 or the organization
itself. 3
The problem of determining just deserts would seem to be straight-
forward enough with respect to the individuals involved; all who are
blameworthy, no matter how many, should be punished in proportion
to their blame. Even here, however, there are difficult questions of how
much punishment, if any, is deserved by senior individuals who did not
know of the offense, yet who had been nominated as accountable for
ensuring law observance.14 The utilitarian rationale for punishing the
latter kinds of individuals is clear; doing so encourages those with the
power to prevent organizational crime to use that power.' 5 Whether
individuals who do not know about a crime can ever "deserve" to be
punished for that crime is a more knotty problem.16 While strict liability
is clearly anathema to retributivists, it is conceivable that certain kinds
of managerial negligence in failing to know of a problem should be
blameworthy.17
The most perplexing conundrum, however, arises from the desert-
HAVIOR (1975); Ermann & Lundman, Deviant Acts by Complex Organizations: Deviance and Social
Control at the Organizatonal Level of Anais, 19 Soc. Q. 55 (1978); Needleman & Needleman,
Organizational Crine: Two Models of Crminogenesis, 20 Soc. Q. 517 (1979); Schrager & Short,
Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime, 25 Soc. PROB. 407 (1978).
10 "[S]ince command differs from authorization only in terms of which party---the supe-
rior or the subordinate-initiates the conduct, one who authorizes a crime also acts with
specific intent." Develo ments in the Law--Corporate Crime.- Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227, 1266 (1979) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited
as Developments in the Law].
I ISee Wilson, The Doctrine of Wilful Blindness, 28 U.N.B.L. J. 175 (1979).
12 For a rationale for chief executive officer liability even in the absence of knowledge of
the crime, see United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975).
13 See Fisse, The SocialPoliqv of Corporate CriminalResponsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REv. 361 (1978).
14 The Supreme Court in United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) would seem to have
eschewed desert-based considerations in favor of utilitarian goals when dealing with chief
executives who can act to prevent health-endangering corporate offenses.
15 See Coffee, B~'ond the ShuI-EyedSentry: Towarda Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and
an E.fective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977).
16 See Wilson, supra note 11.
17 Senior managers frequently set up contingencies for middle managers in the nature of
"Achieve this goal but don't tell me how you do it." The senior manager may know full well
that the only way the goal can be attained is by breaking the rules, so the willful blindness
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based justification for punishing organizations (mainly business corpora-
tions). There are some who argue that because a corporation cannot
have a mens rea, corporations never deserve to be punished.' 8 Neverthe-
less, most common law jurists, and ordinary folk too, would have little
difficulty with a contention that the Ford Motor Company deserves to
be punished when it violates environmental laws. French has abstracted
this common sense approach:
[C]onglomerate collectivities can be justifiably held blameworthy and
hence differ significantly from aggregate collectivities. This accounts for
the fact that excuses are often put forth for such collectivities (e.g. the
Army in the case of Vietnam atrocities) while when aggregates are blamed
the excuses are put forth in the name of individuals (e.g. the members of a
lynch mob). Hence when we say that a conglomerate collectively is blame-
worthy we are saying that other courses of collectivity action were within
the province of the collectivity and that had the collectivity acted in those
ways the untoward event would not likely have occurred and that no ex-
culpatory excuse is supportable as regards the collectivity. That is not to
say that an individual member or even all individual members of the col-
lectivity cannot support excuses. 19
Gross has suggested that criminal responsibility ought to apply to
the organization rather than its members when "(1) [w]hat happens rep-
resents the outcome of the paltem of activities which make up its form;
and (2) the quality of the outcome depends minimally on the peculiar
qualities of the persons who make it possible. They are following or
enacting the patterns. '20
One commentary has concluded that "just as an individual's moral
blameworthiness depends on his mental processes, corporate moral fault
may be said to depend on its internal processes."'2 1 For example, a cor-
poration may be culpable for sloppy standard operating procedures
(SOPs) which provide inadequate assurances of product safety. These
SOPs may have been written by a committee, many of whose members
are now retired or employed elsewhere. 2 2 Hence, it can happen that
while every individual within the corporation is free of blame, the cor-
strategy shields him from the taint of knowledge. For examples, see C. STONE, sura note 9, at
23-69.
18 See, e.g., Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1957).
19 French, Types of Collectivities and Blame, 56 PERSONALIST 160, 166 (1975).
20 Gross, Organizational Structure and Organizational Crne, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THE-
ORY AND RESEARCH 59 (G. Geis & E. Stotland eds. 1980).
21 Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1243.
22 The general problem of aging is a common one with white-collar crimes, which may
take many years to come to the surface. In 1975, authorities discovered Gulf Oil's Bahamian
slush fund through which the company had channelled $12.3 million in largely illegal polit-
ical contributions. Of the eleven executives with direct knowledge of the fund, only two re-




poration as a whole is in a sense blameworthy 2 3 More typically, how-
ever, there are indeterminate elements of both individual and corporate
blame. Who, then, deserves to be punished? Should sanctions be di-
rected at the individuals, the organization, 24 or both?
Just deserts as a principle of sentencing provides no guidance as to
how to resolve the dilemma of whether to punish the individual or the
corporation. Utilitarian principles do.25 A utilitarian decision to punish
the corporation rather than the individual might be made on the
grounds that it is the corporation which has the power to correct the
defective SOPs responsible for the particular type of offense. It is there-
fore the corporation at which deterrence, rehabilitation (of defective
SOPs), and incapacitation 26 can be most strategically directed. For
other types of offenses it might be determined that the crime produces
such a benefit for the corporation that to set a fine sufficient to deter
would threaten bankruptcy, and the resultant victimization of innocent
people. Individuals acting on behalf of the corporation, in contrast, are
not benefitting personally, and are therefore more deterrable. Hence, in
such instances the utilitarian analysis recommends the punishment of
the individuals rather than the corporation. The judgments involved in
deciding whether, on utilitarian grounds, to blame the individual or the
organization, are complex and vary with the circumstances. Even
though the problems of applying utilitariansim to the allocation of
blame are beyond the scope of this article, I would not want to down-
play how perplexing they are. The point here is that at least utilitarian-
ism provides a rationale for the judgment to blame individuals or
organizations, whereas "just deserts" does not.
The only way out for the disciple of just deserts would seem to be
the assertion that it can never be just to blame only the corporation
when there are guilty individuals, and it can never be just to blame only
individuals when the corporation is also at fault. The question then be-
23 When the corporation commits a criminal offense, but no criminally culpable individ-
ual can be identified, there is a "structural crime." Note, Structural Crme and Institutional Reha-
bilitation A New Approach to Corporate Senteneing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 358 (1979).
24 Organizations, of course, can be sanctioned in a great variety of ways. For example,
they can be fined, put on probation, given a community service order, or have their charter or
license revoked.
25 Utilitarianism is defined as the doctrine that the greatest happiness for the greatest
number should be the sole end of public policy. Deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacita-
tion can be intermediate means to that end. See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 288 (S. Gorovitz
ed. 1971).
26 Corporations can be incapacitated regarding the commission of future offenses in a
given area of business by prohibiting the company from trading in that area. Similarly, they
can be incapacitated regarding the passing of bribes through agents by a consent order effec-
tively prohibiting the use of agents to win contracts. See generally Herlihy & Levine, Corporate
Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 547, 623 (1976).
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comes, what possible rationale can there be for apportioning the blame
between the individuals and the corporation? A conclusion that the cor-
poration is more to blame than individuals cannot be meaningful be-
cause corporate blame is incommensurable with individual blame. It
cannot be asserted that an individual's mental processes are better or
worse than a corporation's SOPs. 2 7 How can it be other than the most
crass anthropomorphism to suggest that a corporation is more blame-
worthy than an individual, that the corporation "deserves" more pun-
ishment than the individual?
A tangential problem is that crimes committed on behalf of the
corporation are often not in the interests of the corporation, even though
the corporation may be blameworthy in the sense of having inadequate
SOPs for ensuring compliance with the law. Hence, a scientist in a
pharmaceutical company might unlawfully conceal rat studies showing
lack of safety for a product which he or she has discovered.28 The,
chances of the harm to rats also appearing in humans might be only
twenty percent. If this happened, say the cost of the disaster to the cor-
poration would be $100 million. This long term risk might be assessed
as a greater liability to the corporation (/ioo X $100 million = $20 mil-
lion) than the benefits from an eighty percent probability of problem-
free marketing which would rake in $20 million in profits (80 o X $20
million = $16 million). For the individual, however, the revelation that
his or her discovery is a failure would certainly cost a promotion.
Hence, the rational cost-benefit assessment for the individual is to perpe-
trate the illegality, while the rational choice for the corporation is to be
honest. Even though the corporation has been irresponsible in failing to
adequately supervise its scientists, is it just to punish the corporation for
a crime which, had it known, it would have halted as against its inter-
ests? Would it be less just to do so if the crime actually turns out to be
against the company's interests (the effect on rats also appears in
humans) than if it happens to redound to the firm's benefit (humans are
not affected)?
Corporate crimes are often perpetrated to further the interests of a
subunit when that subunit interest is not aligned with the interests of the
corporation. 29 For example, a crime might be committed to increase the
growth prospects for a division when corporate headquarters is attempt-
ing to contract that division and redeploy its capital elsewhere. Is it
then unjust to punish the corporation as a whole? Would it be more just
27 See suufra note 21 and accompanying text.
28 For case studies of corporate crimes of this type, see J. BRArTHWAITE, CORPORATE
CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ch. 3 (in press).
29 See Gross, Organiations as Criminal Actors, in Two FACES OF DEVIANCE: CRIMES OF
THE POWERLESS AND POWERFUL 199 (P. Wilson & J. Braithwaite eds. 1978).
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to punish the division? Certainly, a fine levied against the latter would
constitute an artificial paper transfer of desert. The lost income from
the fine will ultimately be debited against the corporation's profits, even
though it is imposed on the subunit.
Conversely, a fine imposed on a corporation will harm innocent
parties who do not "deserve" punishment.s0 The fine might be passed
on to consumers in higher prices or to shareholders in reduced divi-
dends. If large enough, it could cause the company to shut down a pro-
duction line, throwing employees out of work and endangering the
livelihood of the community which surrounds it. This, however, is a
criticism which is not unique to the imposition of desert on corporations.
It is a problem common to all punishment schemes, retributivist or utili-
tarian. Punishment of corporations is no different from punishment of
individuals in the way that harm spills over into individuals with no
personal fault. The families of incarcerated common criminals do not
deserve to be deprived of their breadwinner.
There are unanswered questions about how much punishment is
just when it is an organization which is blameworthy. The philosophi-
cal roots of just deserts are in Kant's rationale for punishment as a re-
storing of the equilibrium between the criminal and law abiding
community members.3' Von Hirsch explains the Kantian underpinning
of his position thus:
To realize their own freedom, [Kant] contended, members of society have
the reciprocal obligation to limit their behavior so as not to interfere with
the freedom of others. When someone infringes another's rights, he gains
an unfair advantage over all others in the society--since he has failed to
constrain his own behavior while benefiting from other persons' forbear-
ance from interfering with his rights. The punishment-by imposing a
counterbalancing disadvantage on the violator-restores the equilibrium:
after having undergone the punishment, the violator ceases to be at advan-
tage over his non-violating fellows.32
Von Hirsch also approvingly quotes the identical rationale of Herbert
Morris:
A person who violates the rules has something others have-the benefits of
the system [of mutual non-interference with others' rights]-but by re-
nouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he has
acquired an unfair advantage. Matters are not even until this advantage is
in some way erased .... Justice-that is punishing such individuals-
30 See Fisse, supra note 13, at 405.
31 The core of Kant's retributive position can be found in I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-107 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1965).
32 A. VON HIRSCH, sura note 4, at 47. Von Hirsch was influenced by Murphy's synthesis




restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens.33
"Restoring the equilibrium of benefits and burdens" has always
been a troubling notion. How can we talk of the pauper restoring the
equilibrium of benefits and burdens in the same way as does a million-
aire? The equilibrium is, in fact, a disequilibrium to begin with.3 4 Even
more fundamentally, the "reciprocal obligations" of self-restraint are
rarely reciprocal. As Anatole France pointed out: "The law in its ma-
jestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges,
to beg in the street and to steal bread.13 5 Obversely, while corporations
must restrain themselves from rigging prices, making unsafe products,
and polluting the environment, such self-restraints are hardly relevant
to the unemployed. Both the equilibrium and the reciprocity which are
the foundations of just deserts are farcical when put in their social con-
text. If Henry Ford II were convicted of a white-collar crime, "restoring
the equilibrium" between Mr. Ford and the rest of the community
would seem to open up some profound questions as to what "equilib-
rium" means. Restoring equilibrium might be a tall order here, but
imagine if it were the Ford Motor Company which was convicted. We
cannot talk meaningfully about an "equilibrium of benefits and bur-
dens" between corporations and individuals. Corporations have differ-
ent types of burdens than do individuals (e.g., fear of a takeover) and
enjoy different kinds of benefits (e.g., growth in perpetuity). Again there
33 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 48 (quoting Morris, Persons and Punishment 52 MONIST
475, 478 (1968)).
34 The retributive theory really presupposes what might be called a "gentlemen's club"
picture of the relation between man and society-i.e., men are viewed as being part of a
community of shared values and rules. The rules benefit all concerned and, as a kind of
debt for the benefits derived, each man owes obedience to the rules. In the absence of
such obedience, he deserves punishment in the sense that he owes payment for the bene-
fits. For, as a rational man, he can see that the rules benefit everyone (himself included)
and that he would have selected them in the original position of choice. . . . [T]o think
that it applies to the typical criminal, from the poorer classes, is to live in a world of
social and political fantasy. Criminals typically are not members of a shared community
of values with their jailers; they suffer from what Marx calls alienation. And they cer-
tainly would be hard-pressed to name the benefits from which they are supposed to owe
obedience. Ifjustice, as both Kant and Rawls suggest, is based on reciprocity, it is hard
to see what these persons are supposed to reciprocate for.
J. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 107 (1979). Moreover, the assumption
of Kant and Rawls that allegiance is owed to the law because of a voluntary acceptance of a
social contract is at odds with the empirical reality of existing societies. It is absurd to assert
that, having benefited from the rule of law when it was possible for me to leave, I have in any
sense consented to the law and its consequences. On this, David Hume was devastating in his
essay, "Of the Original Contract":
Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his coun-
try-when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day by the
small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a
vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master, though he was carried on board
while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish the moment he leaves her.
Quoted in MURPHY, supra, at 108.
35 Quotedin G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE 52 (1966).
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can be no meaningful balancing between individuals and corporations
because there is no commensurability between them with respect to the
attributes at issue. It is a nonsense to say of the punishment of corpora-
tions that "after having undergone the punishment, the violator ceases
to be at advantage over his non-violating fellows"36 where the latter are
individuals.
The critique in the preceding paragraph is not relevant to retribu-
tivists who eschew the niceties of Kantian or Aristotelean justifications
for retribution. Desert can be based on vengeance pure and simple,3 7
regardless of any pretence of "restoration of equilibrium". For such
straightforward retributivists, 38 corporations are no less appropriate a
target for revenge than individuals. Let us summarize the conclusions
of this section. It is agreed that "just as an individual's moral blamewor-
thiness depends on his mental processes, corporate moral fault may be
said to depend on its internal processes."'39 Such dependency, however,
renders corporate moral fault incommensurable with individual moral
fault. Moreover, because there is no meaningful equilibrium or reci-
procity between individuals and corporations, there is no philosophical
basis for calculating a proportional punishment which would restore
equilibrium. Just deserts provides no rationale for choosing between
punishing the corporation and punishing individuals within it, between
punishing the corporation and punishing one of its subunits. Utilitari-
anism does provide such rationales.
Now we will put aside the question of organizations which deserve
punishment, and limit the discussion to the seemingly more tractable
problem of consistently administering just deserts to individual white-
collar criminals.
III. PUBLIC ATrTUDES TO WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
Whatever the philosophical basis of just deserts, someone has to be
responsible for putting it into practice, for judging how much punish-
ment a particular crime deserves. Advocates of desert tend to be against
leaving such judgments to philosopher-kings. 40 Hence, judges are to be
denied the discretion to impose their idiosyncratic conceptions of desert
(if, in fact, desert is the criterion they would use). Determinate sentenc-
36 A. VON HIRSCH, sufira note 4, at 47.
37 Or "community vindication," to put a more palatable semantic gloss on the same
concept.
38 E.g., Ingber, A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 861 (1975).
39 Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1243.
40 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 98-106.
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ing becomes the ideal.41 Von Hirsch recommends that maximum and
minimum penalties be set down for offenses of various types, giving
judges only limited discretion within these parameters. In a democratic
society it is expected and affirmatively recommended that the courts
and legislature reflect the will of the populace as to the punishments
deserved. This section therefore proceeds from the premise that the will
of the people in a democracy provides the best means of operationaliz-
ing just deserts. The next two sections will consider more elitist means.
Contrary to the predictions of conflict theory,42 empirical studies
demonstrate remarkable consensus within the community concerning
the relative seriousness of, and the relative punishments which are ap-
propriate for, different types of crimes, except for victimless crimes.4 3
This consensus provides a firm foundation for legislators who would
wish to reflect the will of the people in determinate sentences. Indeed,
one study shows that the responses of people to these surveys conform
with the pattern one would expect from a pursuit of just deserts.44 Be-
cause of the high correlation between ratings of seriousness and ratings
of appropriate sentences, 45 surveys of both types will be reviewed below.
Contrary to a widespread misconception, 46 there is considerable ev-
41 Indeed, in practical terms the just deserts doctrine has given impetus to determinate
sentencing reforms in many states. See R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 139-66.
42 See, e.g., R. QUINNEY, CRITIQUE OF LEGAL ORDER: CRIME CONTROL IN CAPITALIST
SOCIETY (1974).
43 See G. NEWMAN, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN SIX CULTURES
(1976); T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964); P. WIL-
SON &J. BROWN, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY 53-54 (1973); NEW SOUTH WALES BUREAU
OF CRIME STATISTICS AND RESEARCH, CRIME, CORRECTION AND THE PUBLIC (1974);
Chilton & De Amicis, Overcimialization and the Measurement of Consensus, 59 Soc. & Soc. RE-
SEARCH 318 (1975); Figlio, The Seriousness of Ofenses: An Evaluation of Ofenders and Non-Ofsenders,
66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 189 (1975); Hamilton and Rytina, Social Consensus on Nors ofJustice:
Should the Punishment Fit the Crime? 85 AM. J. Soc. 1117 (1980); Kutchinesky, The Legal Conse-
quences. A Sure of Research on Knowledge and Opinion About Law, in KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION
ABOUT LAW 101 (A. Podgoreski, W. Kaupen, J. Vanhoutte, P. Vinke & B. Kutchinsky eds.
1973); Riedel, Perceived Circunstances, Inferences of Intent andJudgments of Ofense Seriousness, 66 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 201 (1975); Rose & Prell, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? A Study in Social
Validation, 61 AM. J. Soc. 247 (1955); Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes:
Normative Structure and Individual Diffrences, 39 AMER. Soc. REV. 224 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Rossi]; Sechrest, Comparisons of Inmates' and Staj's Judgments of the Severity of Offenses, 6 J.
RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 41 (1976); Sinden, Perceptions of Crime in Capitalist America." The
Question of Consciousness Manipulation, 13 Soc. Focus 75 (1980); Thomas, Cage & Foster, Public
Opinion on Criminal Law and Legal Sanctions: An Examiuation of Two Conceptual Models, 67 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 110 (1976); Wellford & Wiatrowski, On the Measurement of Delinqueny, 66 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 175 (1975).
44 Hamilton & Rytina, supra note 43, at 1117.
45 See the studies cited supra note 43.
46 Opponents of Sutherland's definition of white-collar crime, notably Burgess, Kadish,
and Tappan, have been particularly vocal in asserting that moral indignation against white-
collar crime is absent within the community. See Burgess, Comment, 56 AM. J. Soc. 32 (1950);
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idence to support the view that ordinary people subjectively perceive
many types of white-collar crime as more serious than most traditional
crime. Some of these studies were conducted pre-Watergate. A 1929-
1958 longitudinal study47 of moral condemnation of fifty types of behav-
ior found that of the nine items which involved white-collar crime, eight
were among the twenty-five most disapproved types of behavior (charg-
ing interest above a fair rate for loans, misrepresenting the value of an
investment to a potential investor, misrepresentation in advertising
medicines, maintaining working conditions which are known to be detri-
mental to employees' health, forgery, acceptance of bribes by legislators,
tax fraud, and commission of arson by a landlord to collect insurance).
Another early study by Newman48 found that most members of the pub-
lic recommended heavier penalties than in fact had been given to Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act offenders.
A San Francisco survey by Gibbons49 found seventy percent of the
respondents to favor incarceration for antitrust offenders, with forty-
three percent favoring imprisonment for misrepresentation in advertis-
ing. For auto theft and assault, seventy and forty-eight percent respec-
tively favored imprisonment. A 1969 Louis Harris poll showed that the
sample regarded a manufacturer of unsafe automobiles as worse than a
mugger (sixty-eight percent versus twenty-two percent) and a majority
viewed a businessman who illegally fixed prices as worse than a burglar
(fifty-four percent versus twenty-eight percent).50 Harris concluded that
"[a]nalysis of this list leaves little doubt that immoral acts committed by
Establishment figures are viewed as much worse, by and large, than
anti-Establishment figures."' 5' Similarly, a survey by the Joint Commis-
sion on Correctional Manpower and Training found the public more
willing to mete out prison sentences to embezzlers than to burglars, loot-
ers in riots, or prostitutes, although the attitude towards armed robbers,
murderers, and sellers of narcotics to minors was more punitive.52 Reed
and Reed53 found that three white-collar offenses (securities fraud, em-
Kadish, Some Obseroations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U.
CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963); Tappan, Who Is The Criminal, 12 AM. Soc. REv. 96 (1947).
47 Rettig & Pasamanick, Changes in Moral Values Over three Decades, 1929-1958, 6 Soc.
PROB. 320 (1959).
48 Newman, Public Attitudes to a Form of White-Collar Crime, 4 Soc. PROBs. 228 (1957).
49 Gibbons, Crime and Punishment: A Study of Social Attitudes, 47 Soc. FORCES 391, 395
(1969).
50 Changing Morality: The Two Americas; A Time-Louis Harris Poll, TIME, June 26, 1969, at
93.
51 Id
52 JOINT COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING, THE PUBLIC
LOOKS AT CRIME AND CORRECTIONS (1968).
53 Reed & Reed, "Doctor, Lawyer, Indan Chief':" Old Rhynes and New on White-Collar Crime,
3 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 279 (1975).
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bezzlement, and failure by a landlord to make repairs which causes
death of a tenant) were as likely as bank robbery to elicit a public rec-
ommendation for imprisonment. Respondents were, however, more pu-
nitive towards the bank robber than towards a bribe-taker, an illegal
abortionist, and a price-fixer. Subjects recommended that all of the
above white-collar offenders should be sanctioned more severely than a
shoplifter.
The final pre-Watergate study was by Rossi, Waite, Bose and
Berk.54 It revealed the least punitive attitudes towards white-collar
crime. Certain white-collar offenses were given extremely low serious-
ness ratings. Tax offenses were generally rated low in seriousness. Of
140 offenses, "false advertising of a headache remedy" was ranked 132d,
and "fixing prices of machines sold to businesses" ranked 127th. On
average, the twenty-four white-collar offenses ranked considerably lower
than interpersonal offenses involving violence or serious loss of prop-
erty.5 5 A post-Watergate replication of Rossi by Cullen, Link and Po-
lanzi 56 found that the punitiveness of attitudes to white-collar crimes
had increased both relatively and absolutely between 1972 and 1979,
but that on average the twenty-four white-collar crimes still were rated
as less serious than interpersonal offenses involving violence or serious
property loss. Cullen et al explored this further by breaking the twenty-
four white-collar offenses down into types of white collar crimes. They
found that "violent" white-collar crimes were regarded as substantially
more serious than all other types of white-collar crimes, with tax offenses
being regarded as the least serious. While the twelve most serious crimes
in the whole survey were different forms of interpersonal homicide, the
thirteenth was "Knowingly selling contaminated food which results in
death." This was ranked as more serious than homicide "in a barroom
free-for-all," of a "pedestrian while exceeding the speed limit," and of a
"spouse's lover after catching them together." The latter two types of
homicide were also regarded as less serious than "Causing the death of
an employee by neglecting to repair machinery" and "Manufacturing
and selling drugs known to be harmful to users."'5 7 The conclusion of
54 Ross, supra note 43.
55 As will be seen below, however, a reanalysis of the Rossi data by Schrager and Short
showed that white-collar crimes which did comparable harm to common crimes were viewed
as equal in seriousness to the common crimes. Schrager & Short, How Serious a Crime? Percep-
tions of Organizational and Common Crimes, in G. Geis & E. Stotland, supra note 20 at 14.
56 Cullen, Link & Polanzi, The Serioumess of Crime Revisited Have Attitudes Toward White-
Collar Crime Changed?, - CRIMINOLOGY - (in press).
57 Frank Cullen of the Western Illinois University has now completed a further, as yet
unpublished, survey on a sample of only 91 in Galesberg, Illinois, which confirms the results
of this work. Of 41 offenses, "Knowingly manufacturing and selling contaminated food that
results in death" was given the third highest sentence (behind "Assassination of a public
official" and "Killing of a police officer in the course of a terrorist hijacking of a plane"). This
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these authors is consistent with that reached by Schrager and Short58
after a reanalysis of the original Rosi59 data: organizational crimes are
rated to be as serious as individual crimes when they have comparable
impacts.60 Organizational crimes which harm persons are viewed as
equally serious to individual violent offenses, and organizational eco-
nomic crimes about as serious as individual economic crimes.
Sinden's data from a student sample are also consistent with the
foregoing conclusion, although murder and child beating were viewed
as somewhat more serious than any violent white-collar crime.6' On the
other hand, "Employer failing to repair machinery resulting in death"
was perceived as more serious than "assault with a gun," "bank'robbery
($10,000)," "armed robbery ($100)," "assault with fists," and "death
from reckless driving." 62 The economic white-collar crimes were also
generally regarded 's somewhat more serious than individual property
crimes.
An interesting study by Carroll el aL63 assessed students' attitudes
towards Watergate-type offenses (falsifying government documents, ille-
gal wiretapping, illegal use of campaign funds, etc.). Such offenses were
perceived as less serious than violent crimes, but more serious than all
property and victimless crimes. Of course, Watergate-type offenses do
not involve physical injury or significant loss of property. The fact that
the subjects of this study nevertheless rated them as very serious suggests
that less tangible types of harm may be important in assessing the seri-
ousness of white-collar crime. White-collar crime may be viewed as par-
ticularly serious because of the way it undermines the trust and integrity
essential for the effective functioning of major societal institutions.
Wolfgang has conducted the major post-Watergate study of atti-
tudes towards the seriousness of crime on a national sample of 8,000.
Consistent with the earlier studies, Wolfgang found that his respondents
offense was punished more severely than "Killing someone during a serious argument", "For-
cible rape of a stranger in a park," and "Armed robbery of a bank". "Manufacturing and
selling pharmaceutical drugs known to be harmful to users" was ranked ninth behind all of
the above, but ahead of "Assault with a gun on a stranger". I am indebted to Professor
Cullen for sending me the raw data from this study.
58 Schrager & Short, supra note 55.
59 Rossi, supra note 43.
60 See also Sykes & West, The Sediousness of Cime: A Stud of Popular Morality (paper to
annual meeting of Eastern Sociological Society, 1978).
61 Sinden, supra note 43.
62 Id at 79.
63 Carroll, Pine, Cline & Kleinhans, Judged Seriousness of Waergate-Related Crimes, 86 J.
PSYCH. 235 (1974).
64 M. Wolfgang, National Survey of Crime Severity Final National Level Geometric




rated white-collar crimes which caused injury to persons as extremely
serious. Consider this item: "A factory knowingly gets rid of its waste in
a way that pollutes the water supply of a city. As a result 20 people
die." 65 This was regarded as more serious than some direct intentional
forms of homicide, such as "A person stabs a victim to death. '66 Even
when the last sentence of the same pollution item is changed from "20
people die" to "20 people become ill but none require medical treat-
ment, '67 the offense is still regarded as more serious than attempted
murder by shooting a gun68 and assault with a gun or knife which causes
hospitalization. 69 While bribery offenses are also rated as fairly serious
in the Wolfgang study,70 tax evasion is rated very low. 71 Embezzlement
of $1,000 from an employer, 72 although regarded as moderately serious,
was rated as less serious than misappropriating $1,000 by shoplifting, 73
burglary, 74 or robbery. 75
Evidence from other developed countries also challenges the mis-
conception that the community is not concerned about white-collar
crime. Two Australian public opinion surveys both found respondents
to react more punitively to items on fraud by company directors than to
most other offenses in the surveys. 76 Scott and Al-Thakeb 77 have pro-
vided the most wide-ranging international survey of attitudes towards
the seriousness of white-collar crimes; interviews were conducted in the
United States, Great Britain, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Kuwait. They compared the level of penalty which
would be administered for various white-collar crimes with the penalty
regarded as appropriate for the seven FBI index crimes. Consistent with
the other studies, the white-collar offense which attracted the most puni-
tive response was a crime against the person: "The offender is an execu-
tive of a drug company who allows his company to manufacture and sell
a drug knowing that it may produce harmful side effects for most indi-
65 Id item 150.
66 Id item 13.
67 Id item 152.
68 . item 17.
69 Id item 23.
70 Id items 156-62.
71 Id items 164-65.
72 Id item 94.
73 Id item 79.
74 Id item 68.
75 Id items 53, 55, 57.
76 AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, SENTENCING OF FEDERAL OFFENDERS: IN-
TERIM REPORT No. 15, 28 (1980); P. WILSON & J. BROWN, supra note 43.
77 Scott & Al-Thakeb, The Public5s Perceptions of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of Scandinavia,




viduals." 78 In every country, respondents recommended heavier
sentences for this than for auto theft, larceny (felony), burglary, aggra-
vated assault, and robbery. The United States was the only country in
which it was not also rated as deserving a longer sentence than rape. In
Sweden, even murder attracted a lighter average sentence than that rec-
ommended for the pharmaceutical executive. A relatively less punitive
attitude in the United States was also manifest for "oil price fixing."
United States respondents rated this as deserving less than half the dura-
tion of imprisonment than was deserved for rape. For the other coun-
tries, the punishment for oil price fixing tended to be about the same as
for rape. In all countries income tax evasion and false advertising were
rated as the least serious among the white-collar items, although in most
cases these offenses evoked a more punitive response than the least seri-
ous index offense, auto theft. A replication of Scott and Al-Thakeb,
with some minor variations, on 269 Western Australians found a
broadly similar rank ordering of offenses.
79
An interesting feature of the Scott and Al-Thakeb study is that it
shows how white-collar crimes can be perceived as deserving more se-
vere punishment even when the objective harm is less than that of a
comparable common crime. Taking the sample as a'whole, respondents
rated an auto repair fraud in which the victim's out of pocket loss was
less than $300 as demanding a considerably longer period of incarcera-
tion than auto theft!
The other important cross-cultural study is Graeme Newman's Com-
parative Deviance.s0 Newman's survey included questions on two white-
collar offenses: "A person puts government funds to his own use" (appro-
priation), and "A factory director continues to permit his factory to re-
lease poisonous gases into the air" (factogipollution). In India, Indbnesia,
Iran, Italy, and Yugoslavia respondents recommended longer prison
terms for appropriation than for robbery ("A person forcefully takes $50
from another person who, as a result, is injured and has to be hospital-
ized.").81 The United States was the exception here, with robbery being
responded to slightly more punitively than appropriation. Iran was also
an exception from the pattern showing appropriation to elicit the most
punitive responses, in that incest and homosexuality topped the nine
offenses in punitiveness. On the other hand, the average prison terms
recommended for robbery were higher than those for factory pollution
78 Id at 84.
79 R. Broadhurst, D. Indermauer & R. Maller, Crime Seriousness Ratings: The Relation-
ship of Information Accuracy and General Attitudes in Western Australia (1981) (mimeo-
graph, University of Western Australia) [hereinafter cited as R. Broadhurst].
80 G. NEWMAN, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE (1976).
81 Id at 230.
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in all six countries. In part, this was due to considerable proportions of
respondents recommending fines for factory pollution.8 2 Such responses
were recorded as zeros for the averaging of recommended prison terms.
For the Indian and Iranian samples, factory pollution was rated as more
serious than robbery. 83
To summarize the considerable body of evidence reviewed above:
the community perceives many forms of white-collar crime as more seri-
ous, and deserving of more severe punishment, than most forms of com-
mon crime. There are exceptions to this pattern. Tax offenses and false
advertising in most studies are not viewed as serious crimes. Most types
of individual homicide are perceived as more serious than all types of
white-collar crime. Nevertheless, white-collar crimes which cause severe
harm to persons are generally rated as more serious than all other types
of crime and even some types of individual homicide.
IV. THE PITFALLS OF MEASURING DESERT BY SURVEYS
Interviewers who go door to door are hardly likely to get the consid-
ered assessment of the seriousness of a crime that might result from
hours of contemplation or from the real-life experience of sitting
through a trial. Respondents are presented with decontextualized crime
events which tell them little or nothing about the motives, duress, back-
grounds, or intentionality of offenders and victims. While people might
be in favor of directing fire and thunder at white-collar criminals in the
abstract, when confronted with a remorseful businessman in the dock
who puts forth some plausible rationalizations for his wrongs, condem-
nation mellows.
Surveys tend to generate glib answers to glib questions.8 4 It can be
argued that they are meaningful only when they ask people about mat-
ters to which they have given considerable thought prior to the arrival
of the interviewer. On the other hand, it may be that the punishment of
crime is exactly one of those problems that ordinary people do think
about.85 Certainly the surprising consensus which these studies show on
the rank ordering of the seriousness of disparate offenses is inconsistent
82 Respondents recommending imprisonment as the appropriate sanction recommended
heavier average sentences for factory pollution than for robbery in five of the six countries.
Id at 145.
83 Id at 118.
84 D. PHILLIPS, KNOWLEDGE FROM WHAT? THEORIES AND METHODS IN SOCIAL RE-
SEARCH 78-98 (1971).
85 Certainly public opinion polls indicate that crime is a concern which people worry
about more than many other social problems. See N. PARISI, M. GoTC-FREDSON, M. HINDE-
LANG & T. FLANAGAN, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1978, 296 (1979);
Australian Public Opinion Polls, Unemployment and Crimes of Violence Chief Problems
Facing Australia, Poll No. 03/2/78 (1978) (unpublished). For an international poll which
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with erratic, thoughtless responses from subjects.8 6 Moreover, Sellin and
Wolfgang8 7 and Akman, Normandeau and Turner88 found strong
agreement between the seriousness rankings of ordinary folk and those
of criminal justice professionals (police officers, judges), who would not
be expected to give unconsidered responses.
Opinion surveys can only provide meaningful guidance on de-
served punishments by forcing responses onto a common metric. If all
subjects are forced to reply with an appropriate prison term for a given
offense, then these responses can be meaningfully averaged across the
sample. If, however, some respondents advocate an "eye for an eye"--
some the death penalty, some castration, some imprisonment, and
others a fine-we cannot meaningfully average eyes, human lives, testes,
years in prison, and dollars. Much as econometricians may be willing to
dabble with the opportunity cost of a testicle, sensible people are likely
to assess the averaging of such punishments as inane.
Even more problematic is the notion that we can represent the
democratic will by determining desert on the basis of punishments rec-
ommended by survey respondents, some of whom may not subscribe to
retribution as a justification for punishment. If I am selected for a sur-
vey of community attitudes to crime and I find retributivism morally
objectionable, using my responses in determining what are the "de-
served" punishments for different crimes hardly represents my voice in
the democracy with fidelity. Regardless of the shifting views of profes-
sional criminologists, commitment to the utilitarian goals of rehabilita-
tion, incapacitation, and deterrence remains strong in the general
community.8 9
Von Hirsch, while essentially advocating the judgment of the peo-
ple as the operational yardstick of desert, is prepared to countenance
corrections to the democratic will when it can be shown to be internally
inconsistent:
Certainly, the criteria for seriousness will have to be distilled from the basic
norms of conduct of this society. For the standard-setting agency is not
deciding in a cultural vacuum: it is deciding seriousness for a system of
penalties designed for this culture with its particular moral traditions. But
shows crime ranking lower than many other social problems, see THE BULLETIN, Apr. 9,
1977, at 14-17.
86 See empirical studies on this question cited supra note 43. Note specially the study by
Hamilton and Rytina in which "principled dissent" from average rankings of crimes is
modeled. The data from this study are strongly suggestive of thoughtful and consistent re-
sponses from survey subjects.
87 T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra note 43.
88 Akman, Normandeau & Turner, The Measurement of Delinqueng in Canada, 58 J. GRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 330 (1967).
89 Se Cullen, Cullen, Sims & Hunter, The Punishment-Rehabilitation Controversy: In-
sider and Outsider Perspectives (unpublished paper, Western Illinois University, 1981).
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the qustion remains: Must the criteria for seriousness reflect community
attitudes in detail? If survey research shows that most people regard a par-
ticular offense as very serious, is the standard-setting agency obliged to
reflect that view in classifying its gravity? Or may that agency question
the popular view if, for example, it seems to it to be based on misconcep-
tions about the amount of harm involved? 9°
The community assessment in the Scott and AI-Thakeb 9 I and
Broadhurst 92 studies-that auto repair fraud deserves more punishment
than auto theft-would seem to be a case in point, but this need not
necessarily be so. In a principled and consistent fashion the community
might be saying that the victimization of powerless consumers by more
powerful businesses is a more serious matter than the victimization of
one individual by another. As von Hirsch concedes in another context,
"[d]ifferent crimes may not be readily comparable in harmfulness, be-
cause the interests affected are dissimilar. '93 Because of the expectations
we have of parenthood, we might quite reasonably consider it a more
serious crime for a father to murder his child than for the child to mur-
der the father. Perhaps we should also have higher expectations of busi-
nesses; noblesse oblige can be a factor to be taken into account in the
assessment of desert. 94 After all, most of us did think that the men of
Sherwood Forest were deserving of less punishment because they robbed
only the rich. On Kantian grounds of reciprocity, perhaps the major
beneficiaries of the social order should bear more onerous burdens when
they transgress against that order. Certainly, von Hirsch's standard-set-
ting agency might be taking a lot upon itself in overruling the will of the
people when it perceives this to be "based on misconceptions about the
amount of harm involved."
'95
90 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 82.
91 Scott & AI-Thakeb, supra note 77, at 84.
92 R. Broadhurst, supra note 79, at' 18.
93 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 81.
94 The Polish Penal Code, for example, does provide for higher penalties for economic
crimes in proportion to the seniority of the offender. Personal communication from Professor
Leszek Lernell. "Also it is maintained that positions of social power and prestige, held by
many corporate offenders, carry heavier demands for social responsibility." M. SAXON,
WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE, Congressional Re-
search Service, Library of Congress 61 (1980). "I believe that white-collar criminals are more
culpable than their street counterparts. Having more advantages than other people, they
bear more responsibility to set a good example. This idea of noblesse oblige dictates that
white-collar criminals get heavier penalties than street offenders for equivalent depredations."
Comm. Serial No. 69. Oversight Hearings Before the HouseJuddag Subcomm. on Cnme to Eramine the
Characteristics, Scope and Ramftcations of White Collar Crime and to Assess the Adequaey of Present
Federal-State Enforcement Eforts, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1978) (statement of Prof. Gil Geis).
The legal systems of some non-literate societies provide for more severe sanctions on powerful
than on powerless offenders. L. NADER & H. TODD, THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN
SOCIETIES 20 (1978).
95 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 82.
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Another criticism of public opinion surveys as the basis of deter-
mining sentences is that public opinion is fickle in the sense of being
more led by criminal justice policy than capable of leading it. Once the
criminal justice system starts responding more punitively toward a type
of conduct, the community may begin to regard the conduct as more
serious. As J.F. Stephen once posited: "Some men, probably, abstain
from murder because they fear that if they committed murder they
would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they
regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard it with horror
is that murderers are hanged. '96 If it is the case that public opinion is
led by the criminal justice system in this way, then there is all the more
reason to believe that white-collar crime really is a serious matter. Crit-
ics are forever lamenting the fact that white-collar criminals are rarely
punished severely.97 Scholars have also expressed concern that such per-
missiveness undermines moral indignation against white-collar crime.98
Indeed, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice suggested that prison terms for white-collar criminals
may be the only adequate way "to symbolize society's condemnation of
the behavior in question, particularly where it is not on its face brutal or
repulsive." 99 If this analysis is correct, and if our prisons ever were to
become populated by significant numbers of white-collar criminals, one
wonders what indignities the public would be prepared to inflict upon
them. Perhaps we would approach the situation in the Soviet Union,
where according to some reports the majority of executions are for "eco-
nomic crimes,"' °00 or that in Japan, where the public approves of execu-
tive suicide to expunge shame for white-collar crime.101
96 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND (1883).
97 S. HILLS, CRIME, POWER AND MORALITY: THE CRIMINAL LAW PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1971); R. NADER, M. GREEN &J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPO-
RATION (1976); J. REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON (1979);
Geis, Uppenworld Crime, in CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 114 (A.
Blumberg ed. 1974).
98 See M. SAXON, supra note 94, at 61; McCormick, Rule Enforcement and Moral Indignation:
Sfome Obsenation on the 4fcts of Crminal Antitrust Convictions Upon Societal Reaction Processes, 25
Soc. PROBS. 30 (1977).
" 99 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT--CRIME AND ITS IMPACT: AN ASSESSMENT 105 (1967).
100 Soviet Fiing Squads Hit Illegal Businesses, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 11, 1963, § IV at 6.
This report claims that of 131 death sentences in the USSR in 1962, 90 were for "economic
crimes." On the question of working class crimes generating less moral indignation than
middle class crimes in the Soviet Union, see generally R. MAKEPEACE, MARXIST IDEOLOGY
AND SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW (1980).
101 After 93 miners died in the Yubari-Shin Colliery on October 16, 1981, the president of
the Japanese company which owned the mine attempted suicide by slashing his wrists. Inter-
view at Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, March 10, 1982. Another
recent white-collar crime suicide was that of Mitsushiro Shimada after payoffs to secure air-
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Public opinion, especially as represented by social surveys, is fickle.
On balance, however, there seems little reason to view the abhorrence of
survey respondents for white-collar crime as other than a genuine
groundwell of public disapproval. Indeed, the depth of this disapproval
could become even greater than that manifest in the survey data.102
V. MEASURING DESERT BY OBJECTIVE HARM
There is an alternative to what many would see as the excesses of
slavish adherence to the will of the populace or deference to the edicts of
philosopher-kings. This is to rally around certain objective measures of
harm as the foundation for determinations of desert. The obvious objec-
tive measures are number of prior convictions, amount of property lost,
and extent of injuries to persons as a result of the offense. Such an ap-
proach neglects the importance of the mental element of the offense and
leaves us in a quandary as to how to placate community demands for
severe punishments for offenses such as attempted murder which do no
direct harm to persons or property. Many types of harm are not objec-
tifiable-such as the impact that white-collar crimes like tax evasion
have in undermining the trust and integrity essential for the effective
functioning of the economy and polity.
Prior record is a slippery criterion when applied to corporate
crimes. The data of Sutherland 10 3 and Clinard et al 104 suggest that
most major corporations are recidivists of some sort. Moreover, count-
ing previous offenses is a meaningless exercise. Do we count a company
which violated pollution laws on one day in January, rectified the prob-
lem, and then did the same again on a day in December, as having
committed two offenses? If so, do we count another company which
continuously violated the pollution laws for every day of the year as
committing one offense, or 365? 105
The other two common objective bases of seriousness-harm to
property and persons-are quite meahingful with white-collar crime.
craft sales by the Grumman corporation were discovered. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1979, § 1,
at 7.
102 Conversely, it might be asserted that the concern over white-collar crime will be a
short-lived post-Watergate phenomenon. The evidence reviewed above of considerable pre-
Watergate public antagonism towards white-collar criminals, and disapproval in foreign
countries which in many respects is stronger than in the United States, tend to be inconsistent
with this narrow historical interpretation.
103 E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 7.
104 M. CLINARD, R. YEAGER, J. BRIsssETTE, D. PETRASHEK & E. HARRIES, ILLEGAL
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1979) [hereinafter cited as ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR]. See
also M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980).
105 Saxon has suggested that, for this reason, the traditional concepts of "recidivist" and




just as the subjectively perceived harm of white-collar crime is greater
than that of common crime, so is the objective harm to property and
persons greater with white-collar crime.
Sutherland is credited as the first to demonstrate that white-collar
crime costs the community more than traditional crime:
The financial cost of white-collar crime is probably several times as great
as the financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the
"crime problem." An officer of a chain grocery store in one year embez-
zled $600,000, which was six times as much as the annual losses from five
hundred burglaries and robberies of the stores in that chain. Public ene-
mies numbered one to six secured $130,000 by burglary and robbery in
1938, while the sum stolen by Krueger is estimated at $250,000,000, or
nearly two thousand times as much. The New York Times in 1931 re-
ported four cases of embezzlement in the United States with a loss of more
than a million dollars each and a combined loss of nine million dollars.
Although a million-dollar burglar or robber is practically unheard of, these
million-dollar embezzlers are small-fry among white-collar criminals. The
estimated loss to investors in one investment trust from 1929 to 1935 was
$580,000,000.106
In fact, at the end of the last century Barrett showed that banks lost
more from fraud and embezzlement than from bank robberies. 10 7 More
recently, Johnson and Douglas have pointed out that the losses from the
Equity Funding securities fraud alone were greater than the losses from
all street crime in the United States for one year.108 Official inquiries
consistently reach the conclusion that the cost to the community of
white-collar crime exceeds that of other property crime, 10 9 with esti-
mates of the cost differential ranging from the House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Crime's conclusion that white-collar crime cost the
community fifty times as much," 0 to the more guarded conclusion of
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice:
There is no knowing how much embezzlement, fraud, loan sharking, and
106 E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 7, at 121-22.
107 A. BARRETr, THE ERA OF FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT (1895).
108 j. JOHNSON & J. DOUGLAS, CRIME AT THE Top: DEVIANCE IN BUSINESS AND THE
PROFESSIONS 151 (1978).
109 For example, AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, CRIMES AGAINST BUSINESS:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEMONSTRATION, RESEARCH, AND RELATED PROGRAMS
DESIGNED TO REDUCE AND CONTROL NON-VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST BUSINESS (1977);
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, A HANDBOOK OF WHITE-
COLLAR CRIME: EVERYONE'S PROBLEM, EVERYONE'S LoSS (1974); GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, FEDERAL AGENCIES CAN, AND SHOULD Do MORE TO COMBAT FRAUD IN GOVERN-
MENT PROGRAMS: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES (1978); JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS, THE COST
OF CRIME IN 1976 (1976). For a review of these studies, see M. SAxON,.supra note 94, at 8-13.
110 Conyers, Dissenting Views: Report of theJudihciag Committee of the House of Representatives on
the Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980, U.S. Govt. Printing Office (1980).
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other forms of thievery from individuals or commercial institutions there
is, or how much price-rigging, tax evasion, bribery, graft, and other forms
of thievery from the public at large there is. The Commission's studies
indicate that the economic losses those crimes cause are far greater than
those caused by the three index crimes against property.II1
Guesswork figures even more prominently in estimating whether
white-collar crime costs more lives than traditional crimes. Neverthe-
less, scattered evidence does seem to be consistent with the picture that
law violations by large corporations may be responsible for such massive
loss of life and serious injury as to surpass the harm from crime in the
streets. In the United States this century, over 100,000 men have died in
coal mines. Swartz' 1 2 argues that most of these lives could have been
saved if mine safety laws were not so flagrantly violated. 13 Moving
from safety to health, Swartz points out that in more than half the coal
mines in Kentucky the concentration of coal dust was found to exceed
the legal limit-in some cases by a factor of ten. Carson's analysis of
violations of factory legislation by 200 randomly selected firms in Eng-
land revealed that over the four and a half year period of the study,
3,800 offenses were recorded against the firms. 114 The vast majority of
thiese offenses involved failure to meet mandatory requirements for the
physical safety of workers, including 1,451 offenses of "lack of secure and
properly adjusted fencing at dangerous machinery," and 460 offenses of
"inadequate precautions against fire and explosion." About seventy-five
percent of the 200,000 OSHA inspections in the United States in 1977
discovered violations, usually several of them."15 Studies of the propor-
tion of industrial injuries which are caused by violations of the law pro-
duce estimates varying between ten and thirty percent. 116 Taking the
lower figure, industrial safety violations cause some 200,000 disabling
injuries in the United States each year. 1 17 In addition, the President's
Report on Occupational Safety and Health estimated that something on
the order of 100,000 deaths result annually from industrial disease." 18
111 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Crime and
Vistins in a Free Societ, in CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 8 (C. Bersani ed. 1970).
112 Swartz, Silent Killers at Work, 3 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 15 (1975).
13 See also, Lewis-Beck & Alford, Can Government Regulate Safety? The Coal Mine Example, 74
AMER. POL. Sci. REv. 745 (1980). It is, in fact, unusual for coal mine fatalities not to be
partially explicable by violation of safety regulations. I am currently doing empirical work on
this question.
114 Carson, White-Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factogy Legislation, 10 BRIT. J. CRIMI-
NOLOGY 383 (1970).
115 J. MENDELOFF, REGULATING SAFETY: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY 2-3 (1979).
116 Id at 86-87.
117 There are approximately two million disabling industrial injuries in the U.S. each year.
Id at 117.
118 THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (1972).
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Product safety violations are perhaps responsible for more serious
injuries than any other type of corporate offense. Magnuson and Carper
reported that in the United States each year 150,000 people "suffer ex-
cruciating pain and often lifelong scars from fires, resulting from a
match or a lighted cigarette dropped on flammable clothing or uphol-
stery."" 9 The National Commission on Product Safety estimated an
annual rate of twenty million serious injuries associated with consumer
products, with 110,000 resulting in permanent disability and 30,000 in
death. 120 The way large numbers of people have been killed and in-
jured by misrepresentation in the advertising of drugs has been well doc-
umented.' 2 ' One could go on to document the thousands of injuries and
deaths caused annually by violations of automobile safety standards,
pure-food legislation, pollution laws, and various other laws to protect
the safety of consumers and workers. Single crimes on their own can
cause massive injury. Consider the thousands of deaths and deformities
to infants around the world caused by the fraud of a drug company in
the thalidomide disaster 122 or the 125 persons killed when an unlawfully
maintained dam collapsed at Buffalo Creek, West Virginia. 123 Geis con-
cludes, after referring to findings such as those of Ralph Nader on the
building of potentially lethal cars and electrocution deaths caused by
the failure to enforce legal safety requirements on electrical equipment,
that "support clearly seems to exist for the view that acts reasonably
defined as white-collar crime result in more deaths and physical injuries
than acts which have been traditionally defined as murder and
manslaughter."124
VI. THE VOLUME OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
It is not only in terms of the loss of property and injury to persons
that white-collar crime constitutes a larger problem than common
crime. If we exclude from consideration victimless crimes (for example,
drug use or consensual sexual offenses) and traffic violations, it is un-
doubtedly also true that the volume of offenses is greater for white-collar
crime. This proposition can be sustained by showing that certain of-
119 W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 125 (1968).
120 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY 1 (1970).
121 See J. YOUNG, THE MEDICAL MESSIAH (1967).
122 p. KNIGHTLEY, H. EVANS, E. POTTER & M. WALLACE, SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE
STORY OF THALIDOMIDE (1979) [hereinafter cited as P. KNIGHTLEY].
123 G. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: THE STORY OF THE SURVIVORS' UN-
PRECEDENTED LAWSUIT (1976).
124 Geis, Victimization Patterns in White-Collar Crime, in 5 VICTIMOLOGY: A NEw FOCUS 89,
95 (I. Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 1973). See a/so Monahan, Navaco & Geis, Corporate Violence:
Research Strategiesfor Communil9 Psychology, in COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE (T. Sarbin ed. 1980).
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fenses which constitute only a minor part of the white-collar crime prob-
lem are so common as almost to equal in number all the traditional
offenses dealt with by the police.
A study of odometer fraud in Queensland, Australia found that
over a third of vehicles randomly selected from used car lots had had
their mileage readings turned back. 25 The sample in this study is not
sufficient to permit us to assert with confidence that this kind of fraud
occurs for a third of the used cars sold in Queensland. Nevertheless,
using a third as the best estimate available, there would be about 70,000
odometer frauds in Queensland each year. This is almost equal to the
total of 80,181 offenses of all types (including victimless crimes, but ex-
cluding public order offenses such as drunkenness and vagrancy) re-
ported to the Queensland police in the year of the study. Moreover, in
most odometer frauds there is a conspiracy involving more than one of-
fender. 126 Moving to a more respectable profession, Quinney 127 found
that twenty-five percent of pharmacists in Albany, New York had been
found by government investigators to have violated prescription laws.128
Government surveys in two Australian jurisdictions have recently found
fifteen 2 9 and thirty-two percent 30 of gas pumps to be giving short-
measure gas to motorists.
What then of serious crimes by large corporations, as opposed to
the widespread dollars and cents frauds of gas station proprietors, used
car dealers and pharmacists? Few crimes could be more serious than
bribing government health officials to entice them to allow a drug on
the market which is banned in many other parts of the world. Yet in
many countries this is common practice by transnational pharmaceuti-
cal companies.' 3' Nineteen of the twenty largest American pharmaceu-
tical companies have disclosed foreign bribes to the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 132 Every significant coal mine in the United
States receives at least a few fines each year for violations of mine safety
laws. The Mine Safety and Health Administration fines about 140,000
125 Braithwaite, An Exploratog Study of Used Car Fraud, in Two FAcEs OF DEVIANCE:
CRIMES OF THE POWERLESS AND POWERFUL 101-22 (P. Wilson & J. Braithwaite eds. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Two FAcES OF DEvIANcE].
126 Id at 108-09.
127 Quinney, Occupational Structure and Crinzal Behavior: esciption Violation By Retail Phar-
macist, 11 Soc. PROBS. 179 (1963).
128 See alro, Hickie, Favourite Fiddles of the Crooked Chemist, National Times, January 11,
1981, at 3, col. 1.
129 Sunday Telegraph, Feb. 3, 1980, at 7, col. 1.
130 Canberra Times, Jan. 13, 1981, at 1, col. 1.




offenses annually.133 Looking at a wider range of offenses, Sutherland134
and Clinard et al 135 have been able to show that corporate crime is not
a minority phenomenon among large American corporations, but that a
majority of top companies violate the law on a fairly regular basis. All
in all, this volume of offenses, combined with the high probability of
multiple offenders for each offense in a complex organization, is suffi-
cient to invert conventional assessments of the class distribution of
crime.
Of course the data we have on the volume of white-collar crime is
much less adequate than that on its seriousness. It is much easier to
determine how many bank robberies there have been in the United
States during a year than it is to count the violations of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act.136 Victim surveys are possible with com-
mon crimes but not for white-collar crimes, which mostly have diffuse,
unidentifiable victims or victims who do not know they have been vic-
timized. Antitrust offenses provide the classic illustration. Consider the
tetracycline class actions, in which a large proportion of the population
of the United States (and indeed the rest of the world) suffered artifi-
cially high prices during the 1950s and 60s whenever they consumed
broad-spectrum antibiotics.' 3 7 The many people in the Third World
who died because they could not afford the new wonder drugs would
never have conceived of themselves as having been victims of a violation
of U.S. antitrust laws.
Thus, there can never be a systematic comparison of the volume of
white-collar crime with that of common crime. All we can do is demon-
strate what we know to be the minimum volume of certain offenses
which constitute a minor part of the white-collar crime problem. It is
then up to readers to judge whether this enormous volume is sufficient,
when put against our knowledge of common crime from reports to the
police and victim surveys, to make it plausible that there is more white-
collar than common crime. If we exclude victimless crimes and traffic
violations, I would think that the inference, even in the absence of sys-
tematic data, is not only plausible but obvious.
VII. PITFALLS OF MEASURING DESERT BY OBJECTiVE HARM
To base assessments of desert on objective harm ignores the mental
133 Interview with Office of Assessments, Mine Safety and Health Administration (Nov. 3,
1981).
134 E. SUTHERLAND, .pra note 7.
135 ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, sufra note 103.
136 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (Supp. 1971).
137 J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 28, at ch. 5; Wolfram, The Antibiotics Class Actions, 1976 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 251 (1976).
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element of the offense. Retributivists are not alone in insisting that an
intentional offense should attract greater punishment than one arising
from negligence or recklessness, perhaps even when the latter does
greater harm. A weakness of the argument advanced so far is that many
white-collar offenses (e.g., pollution offenses) do not require proof of mens
rea for a conviction. Of course the fact that mens rea is not proved does
not necessarily mean that it is not there or that it could not be proved.
Standards of strict liability are commonly applied to corporate offenses,
however, precisely because of the difficulty of proving intent when it
does exist.
There is a considerable difference between convicting a corporation
which takes money by fraud and convicting an individual who takes it
at the point of a gun. "Criminal intent is not as easily inferred from a
taking executed through a market transaction, as it is from a taking by
force." 1 38 The first reply to the culpability critique is, therefore, that it
is naive to assume that white-collar offenders did not have mens rea sim-
ply because mens rea is not proved in many white-collar crime convic-
tions. White-collar criminals use their power to surround their offenses
with circumstances of such complexity as to camouflage intent. An in-
tentional price fixing conspiracy can rarely be proved to be such since
senior executives can contrive circumstances and timing to render it
highly plausible that price increases are a response to cost factors which
coincidentally impacted the members of the cartel uniformly at a partic-
ular time. There is typically the further stumbling block of an absence
of independent witnesses; the only witnesses to the conspiracy may have
been conspirators or persons in the employ of the accused. The appar-
ent absence of intent in white-collar offenses therefore may tell us more
about the power of white-collar offenders than about the nature of their
offenses. 139
138 Geis and Edelhertz, Ciminal Law and Consumer Fraud. A Sociolegal View, 11 AMER. CRIM.
L. REV. 989, 1006 (1973).
139 Moreover, as Hopkins has pointed out, we often forget how often the criminal law
excuses itself of the need to prove intent in regard to common crimes. Hopkins, Class Bias 17
Criminal Law, 5 CoNTEMP. CRISES 385 (1981). Examples discussed by Hopkins include:
(a) The difficulty of proving that defendants knew that goods in their possession were
stolen. Many jurisdictions solve the problem by enabling juries to draw an inference
of intent if the defendant has had certain previous convictions. See C. HOWARD,
AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL LAW 248 (2d ed. 1970).
(b) "It is an offense for a person to be found by night in possession of housebreaking tools
without lawful excuse (the proof of which shall lie upon such person)." G. WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART 897 (2d ed. 1961).
(c) "In many jurisdictions possession of marijuana for sale is a more serious offence than
possession for personal use. But how does one establish that possession is for sale, that
is, that someone in possession intends to sell? In the Australian Capital Territory the
law solves this problem by simply declaring that possession of more than 100 grams of
cannabis will be taken as possession for sale unless the defendant can establish other-
wise." Australian Capital Territory Poisons and Narcotics Drug Ordinance, 1978.
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Even accepting that a large proportion of white-collar crimes do
not involve criminal intent, the claims made in the previous section re-
main true if the domain of white-collar crime is restricted to intentional
wrongs. It remains true, for example, that Equity Funding, with its
clear evidence of intent, 40 cost more than the losses from all street crime
in the United States for one year. If a third of the used cars in Queen-
sland are having their mileage readings turned back, there is little risk in
inferring that dealers do this with intent to defraud customers; indeed
my interviews with dealers demonstrate this amply enough. 141 The ex-
amples of massive white-collar crimes involving intent are so well known
that the arguments of the last section do not have to be retraced in de-
tail with reference to them alone. We may safely infer that white-collar
offenses involving mens rea do more objective harm and are greater in
number than all common crimes, with and without mens rea.
While the culpability critique does not show the key assertions of
my argument to be false, it does weaken their force somewhat. We have
seen that survey respondents are often prepared to rate product safety
and environmental offenses which cause harm to persons as deserving of
more punishment than interpersonal crimes of violence. Undoubtedly,
they are responding to the greater objective harm of the white-collar
offenses. We know, however, that an executive who kills workers or con-
sumers through an unsafe manufacturing practice may intend to break
the law to increase profits, but never intends to kill. 142 The individual
murderer, in contrast, does intend to kill, and on these grounds is more
culpable. The greater harm done by the white-collar criminal who mar-
kets a grossly dangerous product must be weighed against the more ma-
levolent intent of the murderer. A countervailing consideration might
be that the intent of the murderer is embraced in a moment of emo-
tional distress in which the consequences of the action are barely consid-
ered, while the white-collar criminal coolly and rationally calculates
over a long period the risks of injury and punishment against the bene-
fits of the unscrupulous practice. Other mitigating factors, such as prov-
ocation and duress, are similarly unlikely to be present in the white-
collar crime.
Not all interpersonal violence offenses are crimes of passion, how-
ever. It is reasonable to conclude that the most serious crimes are not
140 D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER 118-74 (1976).
141 Braithwaite, sufra note 124, at 107-20.
142 This may be overstated. Executives who do not intend to kill particular persons may
still know that their decisions will kill some unknown statistical persons. This was an issue in
the Ford Pinto homicide prosecution. Had Ford knowingly increased road fatalities by using
cheap and unsafe parts in its Pintos? See L. STROBEL, REcKLESS HOMICIDE? FORD'S PINTO
TRIAL (1980); Farrell, Corporate Homicide: D fmitional Processes in the Creation of Deviance, 15 L. &
Soc. REv. 161 (1980).
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those that do the greatest objective harm, but individual homicides of
devastating intentionality and cold-bloodedness. The findings from
Wolfgang's study 143 indicate that the general public takes this view.
What, then, is a balanced response to the culpability critique?
First, among that subset of crime which is intentional, white-collar
crimes are greater in number and in harm (measured either objectively
or subjectively). Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that just deserts,
whether based on a subjective or objective calculus, implies that there
should be more white-collar criminals sent to prison than common
criminals. The criminals who do the greatest harm have white-collars.
Even so, these are not the most culpable criminals because while they
often intend to break the law, the nature of their crime is not such that
they intend to kill. While the average culpability of common criminals
may be lower, the upper bound of culpability is higher. A just criminal
justice system might see the majority of the prison population white-
collar criminals, while those serving the very longest terms would be
common killers.
VII. WHY JUST DESERTS IS UNWORKABLE
Having established the enormous volume of white-collar offenses
which "deserve" to be punished, we can now come to grips with the
impossibility of administering desert to white-collar criminals in a pro-
portion even remotely comparable to that currently administered to
common criminals. In California in 1970 only five of the 200,000 indus-
trial safety and health violations reported by state inspectors were prose-
cuted and fined. 144 Only forty prosecutions of gas station proprietors
followed from the aforementioned survey by the New South Wales De-
partment of Consumer Affairs;145 some particularly bad cases were se-
lected, and the offenders were made examples of for the purpose of
achieving deterrence. Meting out "just deserts" to all the offenders
would have tied up more of the agency's resources than it could afford.
Similarly, continual prosecution of a quarter of the pharmacists or of the
autodealers in a jurisdiction would bankrupt the wealthiest of govern-
ments. The impossibility of consistent and equitable enforcement be-
comes more profound with more serious types of cases because these are
the ones which are most complex and therefore most costly at both the
investigation and litigation stages.
Writers who in other respects have been attracted to "just deserts"
as a basis for criminal sentencing have concluded that white-collar
143 M. Wolfgang, supra note 64.
144 J. MENDELOFF, supra note 114, at 83-85.
145 See sufira note 128.
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crime is one area where it is undesirable to attempt consistently to ad-
minister "just deserts." Norval Morris, who advocates that desert set an
upper limit on sanctions, says of tax violations: "Not every tax felon
need be imprisoned, only a number sufficient to keep the law's promises
and to encourage the rest of us to honesty in our tax returns. 1 46
For white-collar crimes against the person-the very crimes which
the community feels deserve most punishment 147 -the case for selective
enforcement is strongest. This is because the offense so often poses a
continuing danger to the community. "Just deserts" must at times be
sacrificed for protection of the public.148 Regulatory agencies often re-
sist the urge to prosecute guilty parties when the cooperation of those
parties is needed to safeguard the public health. If a drug company has
criminally negligent quality control procedures which are putting the
community at risk, an injunction to close down the plant followed by a
criminal prosecution can set company lawyers to work on very effective
delaying tactics. 149 Justice delayed is profits retained. The public inter-
est will often be better served by an approach to the company offering
immunity from prosecution if it will cooperate in a package of measures
which might include a voluntary recall of certain batches of impure
drugs from the market, dismissal of certain irresponsible quality control
staff, revision of standard operating procedures to improve product
quality, and compensation to victims of the impure drugs.'50 In a hap-
hazard fashion, such negotiated settlements foster deterrence, often
more so than a paltry fine which might be handed down by a court. But
more importantly, they do so while minimizing the risk to consumers. A
voluntary recall of drugs already on the market is almost invariably
more rapid and efficient (in the sense of maximizing the proportion of
the batch which is located) than a court-ordered seizure. 151 Only the
146 N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 79 (1974).
147 See the studies cited supra notes 47-80 and accompanying text.
148 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) affirmatively de-
clares that protection of the public is to be given higher priority than justice. Section 336 of
the Act states: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring the Secretary to
report for prosecution.. . minor violations of this chapter whenever he believes that the
public interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning."
149 See the case studies in chapter 4 of J. BRAITHWAITE, suira note 28. See also various
examples of delaying tactics in M. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT 104-30 (1978). For-
mer Food and Drug Administration General Counsel, Richard Merrill, tells of one manufac-
turer with whom the FDA had engaged in "eleven different lawsuits, and each time we have
won a lawsuit he has changed the drug a little bit, changed the labelling a little bit and said,
'Aha, it is not the same one you condemned before."' Quoted in R. HUGHES & R. BREWIN,
THE TRANQUILIZING OF AMERICA 276-277 (1979).
150 For an example of such a deal, see the "Anonymous Transnational" case study in chap-
ter 4 of J. BRArrHwArrE, sufra note 28.
151 See Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD
DRUG COSM. LJ. 177 (1973).
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company knows where all of its product has gone. A seizure which is
resisted by the company faces considerable practical difficulties.
A classic illustration of the dilemmas in choosing between retribu-
tion against alleged white-collar criminals and the wider public interest
was the aftermath of the thalidomide drug disaster.152 Nine executives
of Chemie Grilnenthal, the manufacturer of tfialidomide, were indicted
in Germany on charges of intent to commit bodily harm and involun-
tary manslaughter. After the complex legal proceedings had dragged on
for five years, including over two years in court, the charges were
dropped as part of a deal in which Grfinenthal agreed to pay $31 mil-
lion in compensation to the German thalidomide children. The press
cried "justice for sale." But the German government had to consider the
ongoing misery of the thalidomide families who up to that point had
struggled for nine years rearing their deformed and limbless children
without any financial assistance. Would retribution against Grilnenthal
and its executives have justified perhaps another nine years of limbo and
deprivation for the victims?
There are many reasons for not prosecuting even some violations
which endanger human life. Government safety inspectors have an edu-
cative role which is more important than their enforcement role. Many
unsafe practices are not covered by the law;153 during periods of rapid
technological charge, perhaps most are not covered. The inspector must
build up a store of good will with companies in order to persuade them
to change unsafe practices and to improve quality assurance systems
when such changes are not really required by law. One very effective
way for inspectors to generate the good will necessary to persuade com-
panies to improve their standard operating procedures is to "give a sec-
ond chance" to company officers who have broken the law. Obversely,
prosecuting offenses which were unintentional can foster resentment and
dissipate motivation to improve. Another reason for inconsistent en-
forcement of the law is that it is usually good inspectorial practice not to
recommend a prosecution when the company comes forward and ad-
mits the violation, even in many circumstances where the offense is seri-
ous. The government must encourage companies to confess their safety
152 P. KNIGHTLEY, supra note 121, at 122-36.
153 Any attempt to try to cover every unsafe practice by a rule can run into two difficulties.
First, such a myrid of rules can be created as to inhibit economic efficiency through tying
business in red tape. Second, an increase in the complexity of the web of law can advantage
large organizations which can exploit legal complexity in any dispute which goes to court.
See Braithwaite, Inegalitarimn Consequences of Egalitarian Reforms to Control Corporate Crime, 53
TEMP. L.Q. 1127 (1980); Stone, The Place of Enterprie Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct,
90 YALE LJ. 1, 19-28, 36-45 (1980); Sutton & Wild, Corporate Crine and Social Structure, in Two
FACES OF DEvIANCE supra note 124, at 177.
[Vol. 73
CHALLENGING JUST DESERTS
problems so that they can assist in finding solutions and warn the public
of the danger.
Although there are many more compelling reasons for not consist-
ently prosecuting white-collar offenders, cost is undoubtedly the most
influential reason is practice. Philip Schrag's gripping account of what
happened when he took over the enforcement division of the New York
City Department of Consumer Affairs 154 underlines the inevitability of a
retreat from commitment to consistent and equitable enforcement of the
law when dealing with white-collar crime. When Schrag began in the
job he adopted a prosecutorial stance. In response, however, to a variety
of frustrations, especially the use of delaying tactics by company law-
yers, a "direct action" model was eventually substituted for the "judi-
cial" model. Non-litigious methods of achieving restitution, deterrence,
and incapacitation were increasingly used. These included threats and
use of adverse publicity, revocation of license, writing directly to con-
sumers to warn them of company practices, and exerting pressure on
reputable financial institutions and suppliers to withdraw support for
the targeted company.
Whether we approve of the retreat from the justice model with
white-collar crime, it must be conceded that, given the legal system we
have inherited, the public gets most of its protection from extra-legal
muscle-flexing by regulators which persuades companies to change their
ways. We might shudder at the cavalier disregard of due process by the
inspector who says, "fix that up or I'll be back once a month looking for
things to nab you on." But to the extent that white-collar crime is pre-
vented in modern societies, such muscle-flexing is the most important
way it happens. Moreover, I suspect that most companies would prefer
to live with a little of such coercion every now and then than with the
legal costs of a more litigious relationship with government agencies.
Consistent administration of justice becomes impossible in the face
of the costs of litigating complex white-collar cases. Prosecutors must
confront complexity in the accounts, 155 complexity of the law,156 com-
plexity of organizational realities, 5 7 complexity of scientific dispute,1 58
and jurisdicational complexities in crimes which transcend national
154 Schrag, On Her Majesjy's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York City, 80 YALE
LJ. 1529 (1971).
155 See A. BRILOFF, UNACCOUNTABLE ACCOUNTING (1972); Sutton & Wild, Companies, the
Law and the Professions: A Sociological View of Australian Companies Legislation, in LEGIsLATION
AND SOCIETY IN AUSTRALIA 213 (R. Tomasic ed. 1979).
156 See Braithwaite, supra note 153; Sutton & Wild, supra note 153. For a discussion of the
complexity of law problem more specifically in relation to tax offenses, see Simpflication Sympo-
sium, 34 TAx. L.R. 1 (1978).
157 See the references supra note 9.
158 See J. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 28, ch. 9.
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boundaries. 159 All of these types of complexity are exploited by the tal-
ented counsel which white-collar defendants can usually afford to retain,
and also by the defendants themselves. For example, books of account
are confusing because the white-collar criminal wants them that way. A
potentially simple transaction is intentionally concealed by a round
robin or daisy chain arrangement through a series of intermediary trans-
actions. The inherent and contrived complexity of white-collar crime
makes proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt an onerous burden
indeed.
At the same time, most regulatory agencies are cognizant of the
need for a degree of formal and public punishment to maintain the
habit-forming value of law and to foster deterrence. These ends can be
achieved by highly selective white-collar crime enforcement policies in
which only occasional offenders are made an example of. The offenders
chosen are usually those for whom none of the aforementioned argu-
ments against prosecution apply. They are chosen not because they are
the most deserving of punishment, but because their case would be less
costly than others, because their cooperation is not required to retrieve
dangerous drugs from the market, and so on.
Even when it is decided that prosecution is warranted, the decision
will usually be to convict the corporation while leaving the guilty indi-
viduals within it unpunished.160 The internal secrecy of large organiza-
tions makes this inevitable. 161 Moreover, in an organizational context it
is always possible for every guilty individual to blame someone else in
such a way as to create the impression that no individual is to blame (X
says he was following Y's instructions, Y says that X misunderstood in-
structions she had passed down from Z, ad infinitum). Even if such dif-
fused accountability is not the reality, the prosecution will be
hardpressed to prove otherwise. Many corporations present to the
outside world a picture of diffused accountability for law observance,
while ensuring that lines of responsibility are in fact clearly defined for
internal law compliance purposes. 1 62  Companies have two kinds of
records: those designed to allocate fault (for internal purposes), and
those for obscuring fault (for presentation to the outside world). In the
face of this smokescreen to protect guilty individuals, prosecutors often
have little choice but to indict only the corporation.
In the unusual cases in which individuals are called to account,
they are rarely the persons most deserving of punishment. Some (at
159 See Braithwaite, Transnational Corporations and Coruption: Towards Some International Solu-
tions, 7 INT. J. Soc. L. 125 (1979).
160 See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1248-49.
161 See Fisse, supra note 13, at 371-73.
162 See J. BRAITHwArrE, siupra note 28, chs. 4, 9.
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least three) transnational pharmaceutical companies have "vice-presi-
dents responsible for going to jail."' 63 Lines of accountability are drawn
in the organization so that if someone's head must go on the chopping
block, it will be that of the vice-president responsible for going to jail.
This person takes the (very slight) risk in return for promotion to vice-
president, and undoubtedly a period of faithful performance in the role
would be rewarded by a sideways shift to a safe vice-presidency. This, of
course, is only the most blatant manifestation of a wide array of more
subtle strategies which corporations have for buying off scape-
goats.i 64The selectivity which operates from the prosecutor's end also
has little to do with desert. With white-collar crime, it is common that
the only witnesses are themselves implicated in the offense. Guilty indi-
viduals therefore must be promised immunity from prosecution (or a
favorable plea bargain) in order to entice them to testify against their
superiors. A Justice Department prosecutor once lamented to the au-
thor that working upwards through the organization presents the dan-
ger that some of the most blameworthy individuals of all, at middle
levels of the organization, will be given immunity in the struggle to
reach the powerbrokers at the top. Ogren has observed: "It is no sur-
prise that government witnesses to many fraud cases include the sleasy,
the corrupt, and the guilty who were not indicted, a demonstration of
the price the government must pay to prosecute its prime targets."' 65
For all of the reasons which have been sketched above, most guilty
white-collar criminals are never prosecuted even after they become sus-
pects. This will always be the reality, even though we can do much to
step up the prosecution of white-collar criminals. Paradoxically, the ar-
guments for doing deals which include immunity from prosecution are
typically most compelling in those types of cases which the public see as
most deserving of punishment (crimes which threaten the lives of con-
sumers). Second, the bigger the case, the more likely that it will be so
complex as to render the costs of prosecution prohibitive. Third, the
more ruthless and powerful the criminal, the greater the willingness and
the capacity consciously to contrive complexity into the case. All this is
part of a more general theorem of criminal justice: Where desert is greatest,
punishment will be least. Empirical work on system capacity with respect
to common crime suggests that those locations where crime is most wide-
163 Id ch. 9.
164 Elzinga and Breit point out that one of the reasons for opting for fining corporations
rather than individuals is that corporations may find it cheap to make side payments to
"bribe" executives to accept individual liability. K. ELZINGA & W. BRErr, THE ANTrrRUST
PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND EcONOMICS 133 (1976).
165 Ogren, The Inefctiveness of he Criminal Sanction in Fraud and Corm Oion Cases.- Losing the
Battle Against White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. RV. 959, 974 (1973).
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spread and serious are precisely the locations where the system resorts to
leniency in order to keep cases moving and avert system overload.1 66 In
the rare cases where individual white-collar criminals are brought to jus-
tice, systematic forces make it unlikely that these will be the most blame-
worthy individuals.
It has been argued here that ifjust deserts were to work in practice,
there would be many more white-collar criminals in prison than com-
mon criminals. Putting aside all the other factors which make this im-
possible, cost alone would prevent any government from processing all
the complex cases which would be required to make the majority of our
prisoners white-collar criminals. It is not simply that no matter how
hard we try consistently to administer just deserts, we can only ever im-
perfectly achieve the goal. Rather, identifiable structural reasons will
cause any attempt to administer just deserts to produce precisely the op-
posite effect: the locations in space, time, and in the class structure
where desert is least become the locations where punishment is great-
est.1 67 Kantian retributivism is a philosophical theory which "may be
formally correct (i.e., coherent, or true for some possible world) but ma-
terially incorrect (i.e., inapplicable to the actual world in which we
live)."1 68
VIII. INCOMPATABILITIES BETWEEN PROPORTIONALITY AND OTHER
VALUED GOALS
"Severity of punishment should be commensurate with the serious-
ness of the wrong," von Hirsch tells us.' 6 9 Von Hirsch does not confront
the implications of this bald assertion. Harm done and culpability are
defined as the two key determinants of the "seriousness of the wrong."
While rank orderings of harm (stealing $1,000 is worse than stealing
$100 is worse than stealing $10) and of culpability can be constructed
without great difficulty, there is no unique non-arbitrary way to coalesce
166 See Nagin, Crime Rates, Sanction Levels, and Constraints on Prison Population 12 L. AND Soc'Y
REv. 341 (1978); Pontell, Deterrence- Theog Versus Practice, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1978); Pontell,
Deterrence and System Capacity: An Ecological Analysis of Crme, Punishment and Court Caseloads (re-
vised version of paper to American Society of Criminology Meeting, Philadelphia, 1979).
167 It is also true, of course, that white-collar criminals who are convicted get more lenient
sentences than common criminals whose crimes do less harm. See ILLEGAL CORPORATE BE-
HAVIOR, supra note 103, at 109-47; M. SAXON, supra note 94, at 30-65. Hagan, et al have
shown empirically that districts where white-collar criminals are brought to justice least are
those where convicted white-collar criminals receive the heaviest sentences. The interpreta-
tion of this finding was that in federal districts which proactively hunted white-collar
criminals, deals had to be offered to guilty insiders. This lowers the average sentences for
white-collar criminals. See Hagan, Nagel, Burnstein & Albonetti, The Difterential Sentencing of
White-Collar Ofenders in Ten Federal District Courts, 45 AM. Soc. REV. 802 (1980).
168 J. MURPHY, supra note 35, at 103.
169 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 66.
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the two rank orders into a single overall ranking of seriousness. Even if
this single ordering of seriousness is obtained, there is no unique non-
arbitrary way of translating it into recommendations for the absolute
level of sentences.' 70 Certainly stealing $1,000 deserves more punish-
ment than stealing $100, but does it deserve ten times as much, twice as
much, or what? And if it should be ten times, would it be ten years
incarceration versus one year, or ten months versus one month? 171
Although von Hirsch is exceedingly vague about what "commensu-
rate" or proportional to the wrong should mean, can we imagine any
penalty short of revoking the corporation's right to sell drugs which
would be commensurate to the harm caused by the fraud and deceit of a
thalidomide disaster? Given what we know about how disapproving the
community feels toward corporate crime, there may be many situations
where the deserved monetary or other punishment bankrupts the com-
pany. The community then cuts off its nose to spite its face. The com-
pany loses its capacity to compensate victims, unemployment worsens,
startled shareholders lose their life's savings, whole communities might
lose an industry which is their economic base. The utilitarian has no
problem in averting results such as these when they are patently not in
the interests of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. 172 Ad-
herents to just deserts, on the other hand, will either have to abandon
their principles or go down with the ship.
At the other extreme, just deserts can imply a corporate sentence
which is far too lenient for effective deterrence. Consider an accidental
oil spillage which is discovered in time to prevent any significant pollu-
tion. If there is no harm done and if the corporation was only minimally
negligent in taking steps to prevent the violation, then the penalty
"commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong" might be a small
fine. The utilitarian analysis of the same offense, however, might be
170 Kleinig would claim to have devised a non-arbitrary basis for the absolute levels of
punishments. J. KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 115 (1973). His analysis, however, de-
pends on the (arbitrary) assumptions that the worst crime possible deserves the heaviest mor-
ally acceptable punishment, and that the least serious crime possible (whatever that is)
deserves the lightest punishment possible. In abstract, I might see no moral objection to life
imprisonment. Nonetheless, my arbitrary view might be that no crime committed in the past
has ever deserved life imprisonment.
171 This very intractability of a non-arbitrary shift from ordinal to ratio scaling of punish-
ments explains the attractiveness to retributivists of letting public opinion determine absolute
levels of punishment. See Bedau, Retribution andthe Theog, ofPumishment, 75 J. PHIL. 613 (1978).
172 Of course, making this utilitarian judgment could be complex and difficult when com-
panies are bidding down legal and regulatory standards by threatening plant shut-downs and
the shifting of investment to countries with a climate of regulatory permissiveness. While
utilitarianism provides broad principles for balancing the policy considerations, different util-




that this same minimal negligence is precisely what causes many major
oil spills and that a small fine is insufficient because the costs to the
company of further checks and balances to reduce risks of spillage are
high while the chances of being caught at this kind of minimal negli-
gence are low. If, for example, the probability of being caught is only
one in twenty, and the cost of preventive systems to the company is a
million dollars, the rational company would not put these systems in
place unless a fine exceeded $20 million. To the follower of just deserts,
the $20 million fine would not be deserved: to the utilitarian, it would
be necessary. Moreover, while the utilitarian would advocate a heavier
fine for a larger company ($20 million would be to Exxon as a $20 traffic
ticket to a small company), this would not seem to be possible if fidelity
is to be maintained to the principle that the punishment be commensu-
rate with the seriousness of the wrong. 173
IX. BACK TO UTILITARIANISM
We have seen that at critical points just deserts and utilitarianism
imply quite different sentencing policies towards white-collar crime.
This article has attempted to show that the choice between the two prin-
ciples is really a choice between utilitarianism and a hypocritical com-'
mitment to just deserts, because just deserts in practice can only increase
injustice. By the same token, however, is not a commitment to utilitari-
anism hypocritical? After all, it was justifiable disillusionment concern-
ing the attainability of the utilitarian goals of deterrence, rehabilitation,
and incapacitation which fueled the flight to desert. The difference is
that whereas our attainment of utilitarian goals is very imperfect, the
quest for just deserts is worse than imperfect; it is counterproductive.
Social structural realities allow us to impose desert only when desert is
least deserved. Through adopting justice as our goal, we increase
injustice.
Certainly utilitarian endeavors can also be counterproductive. Re-
habilitative programs can do more harm than good. Across the board,
however, the empirical evidence would seem to suggest that rehabilita-
tive programs do about as much good as harm, having an average im-
pact on crime of roughly nil.' 74 Within limits, deterrence1 7 5 and
incapacitation 176 can have modest, albeit discouragingly modest, posi-
tive effects in reducing common crime.
173 Von Hirsch seems to favor punishments which would not take account of the means of
the offender. See A. voN HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 147. It is not clear, however, whether his
position with individuals would generalize to corporations.
174 See the massive review of empirical evidence in D. LIPTON, supra note 2.
175 See reviews cited supra note 1.
176 See S. VAN DINE, supra note 3.
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To say that just deserts defeats its own purposes, whereas utilitari-
anism has very limited success in achieving its purposes, is to offer only
faint praise for utilitarianism. It also evades the question of how
profound is the failure of utilitarianism in achieving justice. The utilita-
rian can no more fill the prisons with white-collar criminals than can the
retributivist. The utilitarian, however, realizing that his utilitarian
goals are not being achieved by putting common criminals in prison,
can set the common criminals free. A more equitable criminal justice
system can be as readily attained by being less punitive to the powerless
as it can through increased punitiveness toward the powerful. The de-
sert philosopher cannot accept this, since those who deserve to be pun-
ished by imprisonment should be so punished. So the utilitarian has
more latitude. He is free to conclude that crime prevention will be no
worse if, instead of sending most common criminals to prison, they are
given "community treatment" or less punitive deterrents such as com-
munity work orders and fines. The utilitarian can also quite readily set
upper limits on punishments to ensure that in overzealous attempts to
rehabilitate, selected offenders do not have their liberty interfered with
for periods so excessively long as to make a mockery of equity as an
important sentencing consideration. 77 By doing this, the utilitarian can
accept equity (one utilitarian goal)' 78 as a constraint on the pursuit of
crime prevention (another utilitarian goal).
The utilitarian, applying the principle of parsimony 179 to the pun-
ishment of both common and white-collar criminals, will produce a
more equitable criminal justice system than the retributivist who, inevi-
tably, applies desert successfully to the poor and unsuccessfully to the
rich. In saying that the utilitarian can apply the principle of parsimony
to the punishment of white-collar criminals, I am not suggesting that the
utilitarian should accept the level of leniency currently proffered to
white-collar criminals. On the contrary, by punishing more white-collar
criminals more severely, both the goals of preventing white-collar crime
177 Norval Morris supra note 146, at 60, 73-80, has advanced a desert-based rationale for an
upper limit on the severity of punishment for each given type of offense. A utilitarian can
quite happily adopt Morris's suggestion for reasons other than desert. Recognizing that crime
prevention programs can at best have modest impacts, the utilitarian might deem it correct to
put an upper limit on the great harm that can be done to the one for a minimal benefit to the
many. Moreover, many rule utilitarians believe that consistent adherence to equity is in the
interests of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and that a ceiling must therefore
be placed on the possibilities for unequal treatment of convicted criminals.
178 One must remember that equality has a utilitarian justification. Utilitarians generally
assume, for example, that the marginal utility of a dollar taken from a rich person is less than
that of the same dollar given to a poor person.
179 Morris has articulated the principle of parsimony as "[t]he least restrictive-least puni-
tive--sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes should be chosen." N. MORRIS,
supra note 146, at 60-61.
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and reducing class injustice (by narrowing the punishment gap between
rich and poor) can be enhanced. There are practical limits on how far
the punishment of powerful criminals can be increased. If, however, the
punishment of the powerless is sufficiently reduced, there is no reason
why equality cannot be approached through stepping up the punish-
ment of the powerful. The utilitarian is in the happy position of being
able to tolerate convergence towards an egalitarian situation where both
the rich and the poor are punished less than they "deserve." 180 Put an-
other way, the utilitarian can countenance "mercy" for rich and poor
alike, where mercy is, as defined by Alwynne Smart, the "imposition of
less than the just penalty."' 18
To summarize, the utilitarian can accept reducing the punishment
of common criminals down to the point to which the punishment of
white-collar criminals can practically be raised. Because this policy
would inevitably mean that everyone would be punished less than they
deserved, it has to be unacceptable to retributivists. The only practical
way of approaching equity, given the empirical realities of existing soci-
eties, is foreclosed to retributivists. Hence we have the irony: a neces-
sary (though not sufficient) condition for equitable punishment is the
abandonment of just deserts and a return to utilitarianism. Under the
just deserts model, justice is sociologically impossible; under utilitarian-
ism, it is at least possible.182
Of course the utilitarian is concerned to increase the punishment of
white-collar criminals above existing levels, not only to increase sentenc-
ing equality, but also to reduce white-collar crime. In fact, while the
evidence supporting the efficacy of deterrence, rehabilitation, and inca-
pacitation is weak with common crime, there is persuasive evidence that
many types of white-collar crime can be effectively deterred, rehabili-
tated, and incapacitated. 83 White-collar criminals are more deterrable
than common criminals because their crimes are more rational and cal-
culating and because they have more of all of the things that can be lost
through criminal justice sanctioning. 84 Defective standard operating
180 Naturally, the utilitarian would not see it this way, because "desert" is simply not a
meaningful concept to the utilitarian.
181 Smart, Mercy, 43 PHILOSOPHY 345, 355 (1968).
182 Some might prefer to say that utilitarianism can at best make equal non-justice possi-
ble, and that while this is superior to unequal non-justice, it is hardly satisfactory. In a com-
plementary paper I have developed the reasons why the most important injustices in criminal
policy are the structural ones based on wealth and power, while those of like offenders being
treated differently-though important--are of lesser concern. Braithwaite, Paradoxes of Class
Bias in Crim'naljustice, in BREAKING THE CRIMINOLOGICAL MOLD: NEW PREMISES, NEW
DIRECTIONS (H. Pepinsky ed., in press).
183 For this argument in detail, see Braithwaite & Geis, On Theog and Action for Corporate
Crime Control, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. (forthcoming issue, 1982).
184 Some of the things of which affluent persons have more are: status, respectability,
[Vol. 73
CHALLENGING JUST DESERTS
procedures can more readily be rehabilitated than defective personali-
ties.' s5 Because white-collar crime depends on incumbency in legiti-
mate roles in the economy, white-collar criminals can be incapacitated
by prohibiting them from occupying these roles (e.g. the surgeon who
does unnecessary surgery can be disbarred from the profession).
All of this would seem to open up another option to the defenders
of just deserts. Given that utilitarian goals are achievable with white-
collar crime but not so achievable with common crime, and given that
just deserts is roughly attainable with common crime but unattainable
with white-collar crime, why not adopt just deserts as the basis for sen-
tencing common criminals and crime prevention as the goal in sentenc-
ing white-collar offenders? This is precisely what many judges do at the
moment, 186 but it is a morally bankrupt escape route. Just deserts for
the powerless, and comparative lenience for the powerful, is not just
deserts at all. If just deserts means hearing the will of the people con-
cerning how common crimes should be punished, while turning a deaf
ear to the voice of the people with respect to the crimes of the powerful,
then just deserts is a rationalization for ruling class justice.
X. AFTERWORD ON MIXED RETRIBUTIVIST STRATEGIES
It is possible to accept just deserts as one of several criminal justice
goals. The question then becomes how apposite are my criticisms of just
deserts to such mixed retributivist strategies. Three broad types of
mixed strategies can be identified: those in which (1) utilitarianism pro-
vides the goals to be pursued, and desert provides constraints within
which utilitarian pursuits must be contained; (2) desert is the goal, and
utilitarian considerations are constraints; (3) desert and utilitarian goals
are considerations to be weighed conjointly without either acting as a
constraint upon the other.
Norval Morris has advanced an influential mixed retributivist strat-
egy of the first type in which utilitarian goals are pursued so long as
sanctions do not exceed the punishment deserved.' 87 In the last section
it was pointed out that such a position is not vulnerable to the critique
money, power, ajob, and a comfortable home and family life. All of these can be lost through
a criminal sanction.
185 See Hopkins, The Anatomy of Corporate Crime, in Two FACES OF DEVIANCE, supra note
147, at 214.
186 One study found general deterrence to be the main concern reported by judges as guid-
ing their sentencing of white-collar offenders. Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the White-
Collar Ofender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 479 (1980). One wonders whether general deterrence
would have been the major sentencing consideration if common crime had been the focus of
the study.
187 N. MoRmlS, supra note 146, at 58-84.
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advanced in this article.' 8 8 On the other hand, a mixed strategy which
also imposes a desert-based lower limit on the range of utilitarian
choices most certainly is. If we say that all crimes above a given level of
seriousness must be given at least a predetermined level of deserved pun-
ishment, then we are headed for endemic inequity. This is because, as
we have seen, practical exigencies will preclude adherence to this pre-
scription with white-collar crime, while we can approach it, in a rough
and ready fashion, with detected common crime.
By setting just deserts as the goal, but constraining its pursuit with
utilitarian considerations, some of the criticisms of this paper seem
avoidable. Consider the view that the deserved punishment will be im-
posed so long as doing so does not pose a threat to the public interest
above a defined threshold. This would enable us to excuse dropping
charges against the pharmaceutical company whose cooperation is re-
quired to recall dangerous drugs from the market. It would excuse a
lenient penalty against a company which would be bankrupted were the
deserved punishment to be imposed. And it would excuse holding a
man in prison beyond the term deserved because he is extremely danger-
ous, or because, given a few more months of treatment, he would be
rehabilitated. The irony of this mixed strategy, as the above examples
illustrate, is that it results in even heavier average sentences for common
criminals than would follow from a pure retributivist strategy and even
lighter sentences for white-collar criminals. 189 It is inconceivable that
white-collar criminals will be kept in prison beyond the deserved term to
complete their "rehabilitation." Such practices are not only conceivable
with common criminals; in the past they have been pandemic.
Conversely, while the power of white-collar criminals in controlling
vital productive processes will often make it seem in the public interest
to administer less than the deserved punishment, there will be no such
rationale for undercutting the deserts of common criminals. As von
Hirsch has pronounced:
[R]eleasing an offender early on rehabilitative grounds presents much the
same questions as releasing him early on the basis of a prediction that he is
not dangerous. Perhaps one could imagine a treatment program that
would cure the serious offender of his criminal tendencies in a few weeks.
188 See supra note 177.
189 The exception to this pattern is illustrated by the oil spill example discussed earlier, in
which the culpability of management is not great, but because of the great harm involved
and the difficulty of setting a penalty large enough to deter a large company, utilitarianism
demands a higher fine than retributivism. The problem exists more in theory than in prac-
tice, since more than nominal fines are rarely imposed for pollution offenses. Moreover, the
public opinion survey evidence reviewed earlier suggests that, the intentionality of manage-
ment notwithstanding, pollution penalties could be massively increased on retributive grounds
because of public perceptions of the magnitude of the harm.
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But releasing him as soon as he completes his cure-like releasing him im-
mediately if he is predicted not to offend again-remains objectionable as
disproportionately lenient in relation to the gravity of the crime for which
he was convicted.' 90
Hence, a mixed strategy whereby desert is the goal and utilitarianism
the constraint will result in even wider injustices than follow from un-
adulterated retributivism.
Finally, the implications of the present critique for a mixed strategy
in which desert is considered conjointly with other goals, without any of
these being constraints, depends entirely on how much weight is given to
desert in such deliberations. If desert is a relatively minor consideration,
and the main concerns are to keep crime within reasonable bounds
while minimizing disparities between the treatment of rich and poor,
then we might see criminal justice practices quite similar to the principle
of parsimony advocated in the last section. On the other hand, if desert
reigns as the pre-eminent rationale, then the critique will remain sub-
stantially applicable.
In summary, Norval Morris' mixed strategy of limiting the role of
desert to the setting of an upper constraint on the pursuit of utilitarian
goals' 9 ' is not susceptible to the critique in this article. The critique is,
however, even more strongly applicable to a policy of desert as the goal
and utilitarianism as a constraint than it is to a policy of pure
retributivism.
190 A. voN HIRSCH, sufira note 4, at 129.
191 N. MORRIS, 'uzra note 146.
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